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The Federal Government has many agencies whose goal is to promote economic
development and alleviate poverty in particular regions of the nation. One such agency is
the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), established in 1965 to help the
historically lagging region. The breadth of the ARC is so large that Wood and Bischak
(2000) have claimed that the “ARC’s attempt to develop Appalachia is perhaps the most
comprehensive regional development effort ever undertaken in this country.” In fact, the
ARC has spent over $15 billion on economic and social development programs, along
with additional contributions by state and local governments (Wood and Bischak 2000, p.
6).
The ARC was one of the first federal development agencies to have a specific
regional focus, and there have since been several regional development agencies modeled
after the ARC (Wood 2005). Until 1983 the ARC functioned under a growth center
strategy that channeled funds to Appalachian areas that were more economically stable
and appeared promising. In 1983 the ARC undertook a major change in policy with the
introduction of the Distressed Counties Program, which shifted the focus and funds to
counties in severe economic duress.
The Appalachian Regional Commission is important to examine because of its
prominent role in regional development, and the Distressed Counties Program is
particularly important because it marks a significant shift in ARC policy. I used
regression analysis to test the effect of the Distressed Counties Program on poverty rates,
unemployment rates, and real per capita income of the distressed counties in Appalachia.
3Background on the ARC
The Appalachian Regional Commission had an interesting history leading up to
its conception. In the early 1960’s, the idea that the federal government should play an
essential role in improving the social and economic conditions of historically lagging
regions was growing. In response to this prevalent national attitude, the Area
Redevelopment Act (ARA) was passed to provide aid to poor regions in America and set
the stage for the ARC. By 1963 however, some Appalachian politicians were dissatisfied
with the ARA because it lacked a specific regional focus and gave little attention to the
Appalachian region. At the same time, record floods in Central Appalachia focused
media attention on the region. These two factors led to President Kennedy’s creation of
the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC). This commission had the
task of identifying the socioeconomic problems of Appalachia and developing a rough
solution for addressing such problems. The PARC’s findings revealed the “realities of
deprivation” that were present in the Appalachian region, including low income, high
unemployment, low urbanization, poor educational attainment, and poor housing quality
(Wood and Bischak 2000, p.6). These findings led directly to the passage of the
Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA) of 1965 (Glasmeier and Fuellhart
1999).
The ARDA recognized the region’s insufficient economic base and uneven past
development, resulting from heavy dependence on relatively few industries and a
marginal agricultural sector. The purpose of the Act was to help the region solve its
specific problems and promote economic development. The Act was also intended to
establish a framework for joint federal and state efforts, since the states are responsible
4for recommending projects and they receive the assistance. The Act established the
Appalachian Regional Commission, which consists of a Federal Cochairman, appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate, and the governors of the thirteen
Appalachian states, with one being elected as the second Cochairmen (Appalachian
Regional Development Act 1965). The thirteen Appalachian states include Alabama,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and New York. There are currently
410 counties in the Appalachia Region, a number that has remained roughly constant
over time.
The ARDA pursued a growth center strategy, which remained in effect until 1983,
when the Distressed Counties Program was introduced. The Act states that public
investments “shall be concentrated in areas where there is a significant potential for
future growth, and where the expected return on public dollars will be the greatest”
(Appalachian Regional Development Act 1965, p.3). The hope was to stimulate
promising economic areas, mostly urban, so that the region would be able to support
itself. The idea was that the development of these areas would eventually “trickle down”
to the region’s rural and more economically disadvantaged areas. The growth center
strategy was designed in part to move people out of places of little potential and into
those that were already more developed (Glasmeier and Fuellhart 1999). Ironically, those
counties that needed help the most because they were severely economically depressed
did not qualify for aid under the growth center policy of the ARC’s beginning years.
The ARC’s growth center policy remained in effect until 1983. By the early
1980’s, the public was becoming wary of big government programs and many believed
5that the market mechanism would resolve regional economic problems (Wood and
Bischak 2000; Wood 2005). Federal deficits further reduced support for the ARC and,
like many other federal development agencies of the time, the ARC was pressured to
articulate a finish-up program. Facing possible termination, the thirteen governors of the
ARC filed A Report to Congress from the Appalachian Governors on December 31, 1981
in an attempt to serve some level of support for the counties that had not benefited from
the Program because of their small, rural, and remote conditions. This report contained
the beginnings of the Distressed Counties Program, which became effective in 1983.
The Distressed Counties Program initially focused on providing clean water,
adequate sewers, and other basic infrastructure projects to those counties most in need.
The states are responsible for recommending projects, and they receive a certain level of
funding depending on a county’s economic status, with distressed counties receiving up
to 80 percent of project costs as opposed to the usual 50 percent. Unfortunately, the
Program’s initiation coincided with significant reductions in federal funding for
development agencies. As a result, Glasmeier and Fuellhart (1999, p.10), believe that the
Program was “not originally empowered with the tools and resources necessary to make
major inroads towards resolving some of its communities’ most pressing problems.”
The criteria for distressed county status have been modified over time. Originally
there were four criteria: unemployment rates (as a three-year average), poverty rates, per
capita market income (income excluding transfer payments), and infant mortality rates.
Infant morality rates were discontinued as a criterion in 1988 when the rates converged to
the national rate. Currently, for a county to qualify as distressed it must have a three-year
average unemployment rate at least 1.5 times the national average, a per capita market
6income no greater than two-thirds of the national average, and a poverty rate at least 1.5
times the national average. Or, if the county has twice the national poverty rate, then it
need meet only one of the other requirements. Appalachian counties are classified into
five economic status designations: distressed, at-risk, transitional, competitive, and
attainment. For the fiscal year 2006, 77 counties have been designated as distressed, 81
are at-risk, 222 are transitional, 22 are competitive, and 8 are attainment. The at-risk
counties have three-year average unemployment rates at least 1.25 times the national
average, per capita income no greater than two-thirds of the national average, and poverty
rates at least 1.25 times the national average. Or, if the county meets two of the three
criteria for distress, it is categorized as at-risk (ARC County Economic Status
Designations 2006).
The Distressed Counties Program recently moved away from the original
infrastructure projects towards other development areas. In October of 2000, the ARC
approved a new two-part program for distressed counties that consisted of a Capacity-
Building Program and a Telecommunications Initiative. The purpose of the Capacity-
Building Program is to strengthen communities and to promote learning and leadership
through programs such as workshops, outreach efforts to place communities in contact
with other resources, and an online resource center (ARC Capacity Building Program).
The purpose of the Telecommunications Initiative is to provide adequate
telecommunications infrastructures so that the Appalachian region can also enjoy the
benefits of the Information Age (ARC Telecommunications Initiative).
It is important to note that other federal programs overlap with the Appalachian
Regional Commission. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has set-
7asides for rural development programs covering housing, electricity, water and sewer,
empowerment zones, and enterprise communities. The Economic Development
Administration (EDA) funds projects in areas of economic distress. There are several
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Programs such as the Agency’s Community
Development Block Grant and the Home Investment Partnership that have targeted some
of their funding to Appalachia (Wood and Bischak 2000; Glasmeier and Fuellhart 1999).
Another agency that has provided support for the Appalachian region is the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which provides relief after floods, storms,
and other natural disasters. The Bureau of Indian Affairs funds projects to promote
education and economic opportunity for Native Americans, a significant portion of whom
live in the Appalachian region.
Literature Review
The literature on the Distressed Counties Program and economically depressed
areas is plentiful. The Appalachian Regional Commission often performs studies of
distressed counties. Two studies of particular interest to me are the Wood and Bischak
study of 2000 and the Glasmeier and Fuellhart study of 1999. The Wood and Bischak
study examines the factors that keep counties in distress and the factors that promote
moving them out of distress. This study proved to be the most helpful for my thesis,
especially since Wood and Bischak calculated the number of distressed counties in 1960,
1970, 1980, and 1990. They used data from the U.S. Census, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and the Office of Economic Opportunity, and current distress status standards,
except that they did not use a three-year average of unemployment rates, only
unemployment rates for census years. According to their calculations, the number of
8distressed counties has decreased by more than half from 1960 to 1990, and only about
one-quarter that were in distress in 1960 have remained in distress. The ARC began
categorizing distressed counties in 1983 with the inception of the Distressed Counties
Program; it does not have data on the number of distressed counties for any years before
1983.
Wood and Bischak identified many factors affecting distressed county status that
were beyond the scope of their study and focused mainly on two logistic regression
models. The first was a Socioeconomic Model in which the dependent variable was the
probability of a county remaining in or moving out of distressed status given a set of
factors or conditions. They used panel data from 1960-1990 on the 214 counties
identified as distressed in 1960, in increments of ten years. There were many significant
explanatory variables: higher rates of employment in manufacturing, of educational
attainment, and of the percentage of population living in urban areas increased the
probability that a county moved out of distress. A low percentage of minorities in a
county increased the probability that a county moved out of distress. The location of the
county in the Southern sub-region of Appalachia increased the probability that a county
moved out of distress, and this actually was the most influential variable in predicting
distressed status. Wood and Bischak explain that the Southern Appalachian region has
benefited from post-World War II economic growth and this is perhaps the reason for its
strong influence. Another significant explanatory variable was the population’s age
distribution. In this model, higher proportions of elderly and children increased the
probability that a county moved out of distress. This was misleading, however, because
if a high proportion of elderly and children led to more dependents in counties, then those
9counties were more likely to remain in distress, but if a high proportion of elderly was
due to the county attracting retirees, then those counties were more likely to move out of
distress. Insignificant explanatory variables included counties adjacent to urban areas,
the share of federal ownership of land, and levels of commuting dependence.
Wood and Bischak also employed an Economic Structure model, using the same
panel data and the same dependent variable. The results of this model were consistent
with those found in the Socioeconomic Model. The significant factors explaining
moving out of distress were the ability to attract retirees, high proportions of
manufacturing jobs, and location in a metropolitan area. Remaining in distress is
explained by high proportions of employment in mining or government.
Wood updated and expanded upon his earlier work with Bischak in Trends in
National and Regional Economic Distress: 1960 – 2000, published in 2005. Wood re-
examined the Appalachia Region by adding data from 2000, and he also examined other
regions of the country. His findings for the Appalachian region were very similar to his
previous results with Bischak. He employed logistic regression models to assess
distressed county status in Appalachia in 2000. The statistically significant factors
associated with distress status were high minority populations, low educational
attainment, low employment in manufacturing, high employment in mining, low
employment in professional services, and metropolitan location.
In addition to the Wood and Bischak 2000 study, the Glasmeier and Fuellhart
1999 study was informative and particularly helpful in providing insight into
Appalachian distressed counties. They performed a regression analysis of distressed
counties, but they used a modified distress index for their dependent variable. They
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believe that the Distressed Counties index is limited because it uses poverty rates that are
calculated every ten years, which is not very frequent. Their index “takes into account
factors such as unemployment, per-capita market income, labor force participation, and
share of income from transfer payments” (Glasmeier and Fuellhart 1999, p. 56). They
developed a logistic regression model to predict 1994 index levels of 387 ARC counties
using 1990 Census variables and a few measures of 1994 income characteristics. Lower
index values denoted relatively greater economic health in a county, so a negative
coefficient was associated with better economic performance. At the 95% confidence
level, the statistically significant explanatory variables, in order from most influential to
least, were: the percentage of the population with a BS degree (-); the percentage of the
population that was female, single, and had children under 17(+); the female labor force
as a percentage of the total (-); the percentage of the population 65 and older (+); the
percentage of total income from the government sector (+); county location in the
Southern ARC sub-region (+), note that this is the opposite of what Wood and Bischak
found; the percentage of total income from the manufacturing sector (-); location in a
metropolitan area (-); county location along the “edge” of the ARC region (-); the
percentage of establishments that had ten employees or less (+); and, finally, county
location in the Central ARC sub-region (+).
The many econometric studies of distressed county status in Appalachia tend to
find that roughly the same kind of explanatory variables are statistically significant, as in
the three studies discussed above. Therefore, these explanatory variables served as an
excellent base for my model. The literature I found concentrated on explaining the
factors and conditions that kept counties in distress or helped counties move out of
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distress. I focus on the effect of the Distressed Counties Program, measured by poverty
rates, unemployment rates, and real per capita income.
Methodology
I collected data for the 214 counties that Wood and Bischak identified as
distressed in 1960; however, lack of data reduced the number of counties to 200. The
data for each county covered the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. This allowed for my
sample to include two dates before the policy change and two dates after. The dependent
variables were county poverty rates, unemployment rates, and per capita income, all from
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The poverty rate is simply the
percent of people living below the national poverty level. Per capita income is adjusted
for inflation using state-specific consumer price indices with base year 1969 from the
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States.
The explanatory variables begin with a Distressed Counties Program dummy that
equals zero for 1970 and 1980 and one for 1990 and 2000 for all counties. There is a
Southern and Northern dummy variable to denote the county as located in the Southern
region of Appalachia, Northern region, or Central region. A county in the Central region
is designated by both the Southern and Northern dummies equaling zero. There was one
more dummy variable that equaled one if the county was designated as metropolitan.
These data came from the Appalachian Regional Commission. Other explanatory
variables include: manufacturing employment as a percent of total employment;
government employment as a percent of total employment (Regional Economic
Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis); the percent of the population 65 and
older; the percent of the population that is non-white, or minority (Population Estimates
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Program, U.S. Census Bureau); the percent of adults with a high school diploma; the
percent of adults with a BS degree (Census of Population and Housing, U.S. Census
Bureau); national unemployment rates; the ten year average of national unemployment;
national poverty rates (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census); and real
GDP growth rate from the equation (for the 1960’s) Y70 = Y60*(1+r70)^10 where Y70 is real
GDP for 1970, Y60 is real GDP for 1960, and r70 is the average annual growth rate during
the decade. These national measures were used to account for trends in the three
dependent variables. For example, unemployment rates tended to be low for 1970, high
for 1980, high for 1990, and low for 2000. As mentioned earlier, most of data I collected
were the explanatory variables from the literature that seem most applicable as factors
contributing to a county’s economic status.
The only data I was unable to collect that would have been very useful was
Appalachian Regional Commission spending. The level of funding is very important
because ARC funding decreased drastically during the 1980’s and has remained
relatively low. Wood and Bischak identified a correlation between distressed status and
the level of ARC spending. In their 2000 study, p.16, they note that “distress trends in
Appalachia mirrors ARC spending, with relatively high expenditures and corresponding
improvement in the number of distressed counties until the 1980s. The increase in the
number of distressed Appalachian counties parallels the substantial decline in ARC
expenditures beginning in the 1980s.” According to Wood and Bischak, there were 214
distressed counties in 1960, 161 in 1970, 78 in 1980, 106 in 1990, and 111 in 2000.
There were 77 in 2006. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain these data. Recent annual
total ARC funding is around $65 million, which is spread across the entire region (410
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counties and 77 distressed counties). This amount does seem relatively small, and
perhaps ARC spending data would have been insignificant in my regressions.
Empirical Results
My hypothesis is that the Distressed Counties Program should have a statistically
significant negative effect on poverty rates, negative effect on unemployment rates, and
positive effect on real per capita income. I had originally planned to use ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression analysis; however, fixed effects regression analysis is more
appropriate since it captures unobservable county-specific effects. The Southern,
Northern, and Metropolitan dummies were consequently dropped because their values
were the same for the four dates for each county.
200 County Sample
Poverty Rates
The first regression using the dataset of 200 counties has poverty rates as the
dependent variable (Table A). The Distressed Counties Program dummy (DCPdum) has
a negative coefficient, as expected. Poverty rates decreased by 2.9% after the institution
of the program. The percent of manufacturing employment (manufacturing) coefficient
is negative, which is expected because a higher rate of manufacturing employment is
associated with better economic status. The percent of government employment
(government) coefficient is positive, which is consistent with the literature since high
rates of government employment are associated with poorer economic status. The percent
of the population 65 and older (elderly) coefficient is positive, following the logic that
more dependents would increase the poverty rate. The percent of population that is non-
white (minorities) coefficient is positive; often higher percentages of minorities are
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associated with poorer economic status. The percent of adults with a high school degree
(high school) coefficient is negative, so a higher rate of high school graduates decreases
the poverty rate in a county. However the percent of adults with a BS degree (college)
has no statistically significant effect on poverty rates. The national poverty rate
coefficient is positive and has a high magnitude, especially compared with the other
explanatory variables. When national poverty rates increase by one percent, county
poverty rates increase by almost seven percent, revealing that these Appalachian counties
are very sensitive to changes in the national economy. Besides the Distressed Counties
Program dummy and the national poverty rates, the percentage of the population 65 and
older has the most impact on poverty rates; a 1% increase causes the poverty rates to
increase by 0.34. The percentage minorities has the next largest effect on poverty rates; a
1% increase causes the poverty rate to increase by 0.24. Interestingly the percent of
adults with a high school degree had a relatively small effect on poverty rates; a 1%
increase causes the poverty rate to decrease by 0.09. This regression using poverty rates
as my dependent variable gave the best results, meaning those most consistent with
expectations.
Unemployment rates
The next fixed effects regression has unemployment rates as the dependent
variable (Table B). The Distressed Counties Program dummy coefficient has the
opposite sign than expected. According to this regression, unemployment rates increased
by 3.4% with the onset of the Distressed Counties Program. However, this dummy may
simply be capturing a trend in unemployment rates since it is a time dummy that equals
zero for 1970 and 1980 and one for 1990 and 2000. Or perhaps I am leaving out some
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important labor factors that are necessary for explaining unemployment. This could lead
to omitted variable bias that could change the signs on the coefficients on the other
explanatory variables. The percent of the population that is 65 and older and the percent
of minorities are statistically insignificant. The other variables’ coefficients all have the
expected sign. Disregarding the Distressed Counties Program dummy, national
unemployment had the largest impact on county unemployment; a 1% increase causes a
1.43 increase in county unemployment rates. The percent of adults with a BS degree also
has a high magnitude; a 1% increase causes unemployment to decrease by 0.226.
Manufacturing and government employment have a statistically significant effect on
unemployment, where a 1% increase in manufacturing employment causes
unemployment to decrease by 0.08 and a 1% increase in government employment causes
unemployment to increase by 0.09. Unfortunately this regression using unemployment as
the dependent variable did not provide the expected result for the Distressed Counties
Program. At best we can disregard the dummy coefficient as resulting from a poor model
specification since it does not make much sense that the program would increase county
unemployment rates.
Per Capita Income
The last fixed effects regression with my original sample of 200 counties has real
per capita income as the dependent variable (Table C). The Distressed Counties Program
dummy has a positive coefficient as expected (note that all the expected signs on the
variables are reversed with per capita income instead of poverty rates or unemployment).  
Per capita income increased by $131.48 after the inception of the Distressed Counties
Program. The average per capita income for these counties over the four dates is
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$3,351.56, so this increase of $131.48 would be a four percent improvement. The
percent of people 65 and older, the percent of minorities, and the real GDP growth rate
are statistically insignificant. Only the manufacturing employment coefficient has an
opposite sign than expected. The most important factors seem to be the percent of adults
with a high school degree and the percent of adults with a college degree. A 1% increase
in the former causes a $34.76 increase in county per capita income and a 1% increase in
the later causes a $77.95 increase. This regression supports the hypothesis that the
Distressed Counties Program has a statistically significant positive effect on per capita
income.
These fixed effects regressions on the 200 counties that Wood and Bischak
designated as distressed in 1960 give reasonably good results. For poverty rates and per
capita income, the Distressed Counties Program proved to be statistically significant and
improved both. Unemployment, however, was a different story, and although the
Distressed Counties Program dummy was statistically significant, the direction of its
effect was opposite of expected. Yet I would hesitate to conclude that the Distressed
Counties Program increased unemployment. Instead, I explain this result as a
consequence of a poorly specified model or perhaps an insufficiency in capturing the
Program through a simple time dummy that can easily pick up other effects. Overall, I
am impressed by the results of these regressions. The fact that the Distressed Counties
Program had an effect on lowering poverty rates and increasing per capita income is
promising since the ARC funding was low and these counties have historically been
plagued by poverty. The ARC does aim to make “strategic investments that encourage
other Federal, State, local and private participation and dollars” (The Budget for Fiscal
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Year 2000). Perhaps some of the effects captured by the Distressed Counties Program
dummy is the success of the ARC strategic investments since ARC funding itself is low
and is most likely too small to make a significant impact in these areas by itself.
Chow Test
I also did a Chow test for each of the dependent variables. This tests for a
structural break or regime change by allowing for the coefficients to be different before
and after the Program was instituted. Three regressions are run to obtain the Chow
statistic. The first is the constrained regression in which the coefficients are the same
before and after the change. In my case, this change would be the initiation of the
Distressed Counties Program. I did a fixed effects regression for years 1970, 1980, 1990,
2000. The second regression is before the regime change, so I did a fixed effects
regression for only 1970 and 1980. The third regression is after the regime change, for
1990 and 2000. The Chow statistic is derived from the equation [(RSSc - (RSSb +
RSSa))/k] / [(RSSb + RSSa) / (nb + na - 2k)] where RSS is the residual sum of squares for
the constrained regression (denoted by c), the before regression (b), and the after
regression (a), k is the number of parameters, and n is the number of observations. If the
Chow statistic is greater than F(k, nb + na - 2k), which is found using a F distribution
table, then you can reject the null hypothesis that there is no structural break. For poverty
rates as the dependent variable, the Chow statistic was greater than F so we can reject the
null hypothesis (Table D). The results were the same using unemployment rates and per
capita income as the dependent variable. The Chow test showed that there was a
statistically significant structural break after the onset of the Distressed Counties
Program. This was confirmed for poverty rates, unemployment, and per capita income.
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Poverty Rates
A closer look at the Chow regression with poverty rates as the dependent variable,
shows that manufacturing employment and the percent of adults with a high school
degree are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and have the expected sign
only for the after regression (Table E). Government employment and the percent of
minorities are statistically significant and have the correct sign only for the before
regression. The percent of the population 65 and older and national poverty rates are
statistically significant and have the correct signs for both regressions. The percent of the
population 65 and older has a higher coefficient in the before regression (0.21) than in the
after regression (0.07). This is true for national poverty rates as well; in the before
regression its coefficient is 10.51, which seems very high, and in the after regression its
coefficient is 3.84. This perhaps indicates a positive influence of the Distressed Counties
Program since after its inception these counties are not as sensitive to changes in national
poverty rates. The percent of adults with a BS degree is statistically insignificant in both
regressions.
Unemployment Rates
When unemployment rates are used as the dependent variable for the Chow test,
manufacturing employment and the ten year average of national unemployment rates are
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and have the correct sign in both
regressions (the ten year average of national unemployment is used instead of national
unemployment because it gives better results) (Table F). The magnitude of the
manufacturing employment coefficient is greater in the after regression (-0.21) than in the
before regression (-0.07). So manufacturing after the institution of the Distressed
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Counties Program decreases unemployment more than before the Program. The ten year
average of national unemployment coefficient is 0.65 in the before regression and 1.65 in
the after regression. This is not expected since one would think that after the beginning
of the Program, county unemployment would be less influenced by national levels.
Government employment is statistically significant and has the correct sign only in the
before regression. The percent of the population 65 and older, the percent of minorities,
the percent of adults with a high school degree, and the percent of adults with a BS
degree are statistically insignificant in both regressions.
Per Capita Income
When per capita income is used as the dependent variable for the Chow test,
manufacturing employment and the percent of adults with a high school degree are
statistically insignificant in both regressions (Table G). Government employment and
national poverty rates are statistically significant and have the expected signs for both
regressions (national poverty rates are used in place of the growth rate of national GDP
because the former is statistically significant and gives better regression results).
Government employment has a coefficient of -9.42 in the before regression and -16.40 in
the after regression. This would not be expected since one would hope that after the
institution of the Program high government employment would not have such a negative
effect on per capita income. The national poverty rate has a coefficient of -543.23 in the
before regression and -780.26 in the after regression. Again this would not be expected
because this result shows that after the institution of the Program per capita levels were
even more sensitive to changes in national poverty levels. The percent of the population
65 and older and the percent of minorities are statistically significant only in the before
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regression, and they have the expected signs. These results are good because they show
that the percent of the population 65 and older and the percent of minorities do not have a
statistically significant negative affect on per capita income after the institution of the
Program. The percent of adults with a BS degree is statistically significant only in the
after regression and it has the expected sign. This is an interesting result and shows that
only after the institution of the Program does the percent of adults with a BS degree have
a statistically significant positive affect on per capita income.
Considerations
A concern arose about possibly having an endogenous model since about half of
the 1960 distressed counties were no longer distressed in 1990 and 2000. If some of the
counties were not classified as distressed and assuming that the Distressed Counties
Program only helps distressed counties, then the causal relationship would be going in
both directions in my sample. To avoid this I modified my dataset to create two new
datasets. The first dataset consists of 57 counties that were distressed in 1960, 1970,
1980, 1990, and 2000. The second dataset consists of counties that were distressed in




The first regression with the 57 county dataset has poverty rates as the dependent
variable, and again I used fixed effects (Table H). The Distressed Counties Program
dummy coefficient is -4.4, which is the expected sign. The Distressed Counties Program
dummy is -2.9 in the regression using the 200 county dataset, implying that the Program
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had a greater effect on poverty rates in the counties that were distressed from 1960 to
2000. However, there are a lot of statistically insignificant variables in this regression.
Only the dummy, government employment, and national poverty rates are statistically
significant. The national poverty rates increased to 9.3, as opposed to 6.9 in the previous
regression, suggesting that national poverty rates has a more dominant effect on the
poverty rate in these 57 counties. This number actually seems too large, since a 1%
increase in national poverty rates would cause a 9.3 increase in county poverty rates;
even 6.9 seems too high.
I tried using different national variables such as national unemployment and the
ten year average of national unemployment. When national unemployment is used in
place of national poverty rates, the Distressed Counties Program dummy has a positive
sign and the national unemployment coefficient is negative, so both were the opposite of
expected and not logical since an increase in unemployment should not decrease the
poverty rate. It is the same story when the ten year average of national unemployment is
used. When national unemployment is used along with national poverty rates, the
Distressed Counties Program dummy is negative as expected, but the national
unemployment coefficient was negative, and the national poverty rate coefficient is still
very high at 7.85. When the ten year average of national unemployment is used with
national poverty rates, the Distressed Counties Program dummy is statistically
insignificant, the sign is wrong on average national unemployment, and the coefficient on
the national poverty rates is even higher at 8.31. So changing the national variables does
not help lower the national poverty rate effect and using only the national poverty rates
gives the best results in terms of what was expected.
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Unemployment Rates
The second regression using the 57 county dataset has unemployment rates as the
dependent variable, and again I used fixed effects (Table I). The Distressed Counties
Program dummy still has the opposite sign than expected. The percent of the population
65 and the older and percent of minorities are statistically insignificant, as they are in the
200 county dataset regression, and percent of adults with a BS degree is statistically
insignificant. It is interesting that the percent of adults with a BS degree does not have a
statistically significant effect on unemployment for these 57 counties. Perhaps this is
because the percent is lower in these counties; the average is 6.87% over the four dates
and across the 57 counties and 7.83% across the 200 counties. The remaining variables,
all statistically significant, have the expected signs on the coefficients. Also the
magnitudes of the effect on unemployment are greater for manufacturing employment,
government employment, percent of adults with high school degrees, and national
unemployment than in the 200 county dataset regression.
In an attempt to get the expected negative sign on the Distressed Counties
Program dummy when unemployment is the dependent variable, I tried different national
variables. I used the ten year average of national unemployment, national poverty rates,
the real GDP growth rate, and the growth rate of county per capita income, which is
derived from the equation (for 1980) Y80 = Y70*(1+r80) ^10 where Y80 is the county per
capita income for 1980, Y70 is the county per capita income for 1970, and r780 is the
average annual growth rate. Only the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 are included when the
growth rate of county per income is used since I do not have the 1960 per capita income
for each of the counties. When the ten year average of national unemployment is used,
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the results are very similar to when national unemployment is used, and only the
magnitudes of the coefficients change slightly. The regressions with national poverty
rates and real GDP growth rate still gave a positive coefficient for the Distressed
Counties Program dummy. When the growth rate of county per capita income is used,
even in conjunction with the other national variables, the Distressed Counties Program
dummy always remains positive.
Per Capita Income
The third fixed effects regression using the 57 county dataset has per capita
income as the dependent variable (Table J). The Distressed Counties Program dummy is
statistically insignificant, unlike it is in the 200 county dataset regression. Manufacturing
employment, the percent of the population 65 and older, the percent of minorities, the
percent of adults with BS degree, and real GDP growth rate were also statistically
insignificant. Government employment and the percent of adults with high school
degrees are the only statistically significant variables, and their coefficients are very close
to those in the 200 county dataset regression.
Chow Test
Poverty Rates
I also performed Chow tests using the 57 county dataset and poverty rates,
unemployment rates, and per capita income as the dependent variables (Table K). The
results are the same as with the 200 county dataset, and in each case I am able to reject
the null hypothesis that there was no structural break. This again confirms that there was
a significant change with the onset of the Distressed Counties Program. Specifically,
with poverty rates as the dependent variable, manufacturing employment, the percent of
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the population 65 and older, and the percent of adults with a high school degree are
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level in the after regression and have the
expected sign (Table L). But they are statistically insignificant in the before regression.
Perhaps the Distressed Counties Program indirectly influenced the effect that
manufacturing employment and the percent of adults with high school degrees had on
county poverty rates. Government employment and national poverty rates are
statistically significant in both regressions and have the correct sign. The magnitude of
their coefficients is lower in the after regression, especially for national poverty rates,
which is 7.73 before and 3.36 after, suggesting that after the Program these counties are
not as subject to national trends in poverty rates as before the Program. The percent of
minorities is statistically significant and has the correct sign on its coefficient only in the
before regression. The percent of adults with a BS degree is statistically insignificant in
both regressions.
Unemployment Rates
When unemployment rates are used as the dependent variable, manufacturing
employment is statistically significant only in the after regression, and it has the correct
sign (Table M). Government employment is statistically significant only in the before
regression and has the expected sign. The percent of population 65 and older, the percent
of minorities, the percent of adults with a high school degree, and the percent of adults
with a BS degree are all statistically insignificant in both regressions. The ten year
average of national unemployment (avgnatlunemp) is statistically significant only in the
after regression and has the correct sign. Unfortunately, these results to do not give much
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insight into the regime change, before and after the institution of the Distressed Counties
Program.
Per Capita Income
When per capita income is used as the dependent variable, manufacturing
employment is statistically significant only in the before regression but it does not have
the expected sign (Table N). Government employment and national poverty rates are
statistically significant and have the correct sign on the coefficient for both regressions.
The magnitude of government employment’s coefficient is lower in the after regression,
so having high government employment has less of a negative effect on per capita
income after the beginning of the Program. The opposite is true for national poverty rates
because after the Program, national poverty rates have even more of an effect on per
capita income; a 1% increase in national poverty rates decreases county per capita
income by $993.74. The percent of the population 65 and older, the percent of
minorities, the percent of adults with a high school degree, and the percent of adults with
a BS degree are all statistically insignificant in both regressions.
91 County Sample
The 57 county dataset is useful since it eliminates the possibility of endogeneity.
However this significantly reduces the number of counties in my dataset and these are the
counties that we already know do not move out of distressed status. The results suggest
something different about the Distressed Counties Program effect on per capita income
since it is statistically insignificant (it was statistically significant using the 200 county
dataset). I decided to also use a dataset of 91 counties that were distressed in 1990 and
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2000, after the beginning of the Program. This allows for a larger number of counties
and does not restrict the dataset to those distressed in 1970 and 1980 as well.
As one might imagine, the results are basically the same as those found using the
57 county dataset. When poverty rates are used as the dependent variable, the Distressed
Counties Program dummy is negative and its magnitude of -4.0 falls between that of the
200 county dataset (-2.9) and the 57 county dataset (-4.4) (Table O). The national
poverty rate coefficient is very high at 9.6, and as before I tried different national
variables but had no success. When unemployment is used as the dependent variable, the
Distressed Counties Program dummy is positive, as it was in the regressions using the
other two datasets (Table P).  When per capita income is used as the dependent variable,
the Distressed Counties Program dummy is statistically insignificant (Table Q).  I also
did Chow tests with this dataset for poverty rates, unemployment rates, and per capita
income I am able to reject the null hypothesis that there was no structural break or regime
change.
200 County Sample
In comparing my three datasets, the 200 county set gives the most expected
results since the Distressed Counties Program dummy in the per capita income regression
is statistically significant and had the correct sign on it. In the other two datasets it is
statistically insignificant, which may simply reveal that the Program was not aiming to
increase per capita income and was focusing its attention elsewhere. In all three datasets,
the Distressed Counties Program has a statistically significant positive effect on poverty
rates (it brought poverty rates down). Also in all three datasets, the Distressed Counties
Program dummy has the wrong sign in the unemployment regression. As mentioned
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earlier, this is most likely because my model is missing some important explanatory
variables or because the dummy is picking up other effects.
Altering the Dummy
I also tried defining my dummy differently to capture the effects of the Distressed
Counties Program. The first alteration was to use my 200 county set but to have the
dummy equal one for only those counties that were distressed in 1990 and 2000. In
effect the dummy would represent the eligibility for Distressed Counties Grants, so those
counties that were not classified as distressed in 1990 and 2000 have the dummy equal to
zero. The results are not good for this regression because the dummy coefficient had the
opposite sign than expected for poverty rates, unemployment, and per capita income
(Tables R, S, and T). Instead of capturing the Distressed Counties Program, this dummy
simply captures the fact that these counties were distressed, characterized by high poverty
and unemployment rates and low per capita income. In this light, the signs on the
dummy are reasonable.
The second alteration is to have the dummy capture targeted aid. The idea was
that non-distressed counties in 1970 and 1980 would be receiving ARC aid under the
growth center policy and that distressed counties would be receiving ARC aid in 1990
and 2000. So the dummy equaled one for non-distressed counties in 1970 and 1980 and
it equaled one for distressed counties in 1990 and 2000. When poverty rates are used as
the dependent variable, the dummy is statistically insignificant (Table U). When
unemployment is the dependent variable, the dummy has the opposite sign than expected
and suggests that when ARC funding was targeted to that type of county the
unemployment increased by 0.36 (Table V). When per capita income is used as the
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dependent variable, the dummy had the opposite effect than expected, implying that when
ARC funding is targeted to that type of county the per capita income decreases by
$111.66 (Table W).
These results are not reasonable and this is most likely because the idea behind
the dummy variable was faulty. The counties that were non-distressed in 1970 and 1980
probably would not have been the counties receiving aid under the growth center policy
because the counties in my dataset were still very poor even though they were not
technically distressed. These counties were all distressed in 1960 and it is unlikely that
they made large strides in ten or twenty years to become one of the promising urban
centers to which the ARC was targeting its aid. Also it is reasonable to assume that a
least a good number of these counties remained at a poor economic level through 2000
and would be on the margin, at-risk, in 1990 and 2000. In this case most of the counties
in the sample would be among the poorest counties in Appalachia and the shift in ARC
policy, represented by the Distressed Counties Program, does not exclusively aid
distressed counties.
The 2006 Budget of the United States Government states that the ARC’s “area
development funds are allocated…for projects that promote sustainable regional
economic development, with assistance targeted at the most distressed and
underdeveloped counties and areas…those communities with the greatest needs.” There
are two important insights in this statement. First as discussed, assistance is targeted not
only to distressed counties but those with greatest needs, which at least some of the non-
distressed counties in my 200 county dataset would most likely fall under. Second, the
projects are aimed at regional development. It would not be unreasonable that the non-
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distressed counties in my dataset border the distressed counties because there seem to be
pockets of poverty. Even by looking at the distressed counties in 2006 one can see that
there are clusters of distressed counties (Table X). So perhaps the 1990 and 2000 non-
distressed counties are benefiting from ARC regional development projects.
Using this logic, the 200 county dataset with the original Distressed Counties
Program dummy is the most appropriate dataset. Also using fixed effects takes into
account the fact that some of these counties are doing slightly better, moving out of
distress. In addition, using the 57 or 91 county datasets in a sense restricts the effects of
the Distressed Counties Program since these counties never move out of distress;
therefore, their poverty and unemployment rates never move below a certain level and
their per capita income never moves above a certain level. Looking at the empirical
results, the F values are much better for the regressions using the 200 county dataset, but
this most likely is because of a larger sample size.
Interacting the Dummy
Poverty Rates
I also tried interacting the Distressed Counties Program dummy. I interacted the
dummy with manufacturing employment, the percent of adults with a high school degree,
and the percent of adults with a BS degree. When I used the 200 county dataset and
poverty rates as the dependent variable, the Distressed Counties Program dummy, the
dummy interacted with manufacturing employment, and the dummy interacted with the
percent of adults with a BS degree have the expected signs and are statistically
significant. However, the signs on manufacturing employment and the percent of adults
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with a BS degree were not as expected and therefore the shift in their slopes, their
coefficients, does not make sense.
Unemployment Rates
When I used the 200 county dataset and unemployment rates as the dependent
variable, the Distressed Counties Program dummy has the opposite sign than expect, as
usual. But, the dummy interacted with manufacturing employment and the dummy
interacted with the percent of adults with a BS degree have the correct signs and are
statistically significant. Manufacturing employment has the correct sign and is
statistically significant, yet the percent of adults with a BS degree is not statistically
significant. This regression shows that before the program a 1% increase in
manufacturing employment caused unemployment to decrease by 0.07. After the
program this effect was even larger, decreasing unemployment by an additional 0.06
(0.13 total). However this may also simply mean that manufacturing has a greater impact
in more recent years, 1990 and 2000, than in earlier year, which is perhaps more
reasonable since the Distressed Counties Program does not specifically have the goal of
increasing manufacturing jobs. The Program would be more likely to effect education,
such as the percentage of adults with high school degrees. The percent of adults with a
BS degree decreases the unemployment rate by an additional 0.14 after the inception of
the Program.
Per Capita Income
When I used the 200 county dataset and per capita income as the dependent
variable, the Distressed Counties Program dummy has the opposite sign than expected,
suggesting that per capita income decreased by $509.51 with the onset of the Program.
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As with the poverty rate and unemployment regressions, the percent of adults with high
school degrees interacted with the dummy is statistically insignificant and the other two
interacted dummies are statistically significant. Manufacturing employment has the
opposite sign than expected (-9.26) and with the change after the Program (add 11.71 to
the coefficient) this amounts only to a $2.45 increase in per capita income when
manufacturing employment increases by 1%. The percent of adults with BS degrees
makes more sense and the coefficient before the Program is 46.32 and 67.33 after the
Program. Again though, this may simply reflect that a college education has a greater
impact in recent years than in the past.
Conclusions
While the regressions with the interacted dummy are interesting, I hesitate to
draw any definite conclusions from them. I will focus more on my results from the fixed
effects regressions using the 200 county dataset that was derived from Wood and
Bischak’s designation of 1960 distressed counties. These empirical results are very
favorable for the Distressed Counties Program since they showed that the Program is
making inroads in improving poverty rates and per capita income. Furthermore, at the
beginning of this process I was not sure if the Program would have any statistically
significant effect on poverty rates, unemployment, or per capita income. Unfortunately
the unemployment regressions do not produce the expected sign for the Distressed
Counties Program.
But the unemployment results aside, the ARC seems to have been successful in its
attempts to provide help to the most distressed counties that did not receive aid in the
early years under the growth center strategy. Even with cuts in funding the ARC was
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able to improve poverty rates and per capita income in the distressed counties. This is
impressive since agencies have certain goals in mind but they are not always met. The
ARC is noteworthy not only to have recognized their earlier mistake of providing aid to
the more promising areas while neglecting those who needed aid the most, but then to
have corrected this problem in an effective way. It is certainly not easy to improve areas
of poverty, especially with little funds, so even small increases in per capita income or a
slight decrease in poverty rates is respectable. Perhaps one of the reasons the ARC has
been successful is because of their deep understanding of the Appalachian region and the
explanatory factors behind poverty.
The most influential study in writing my thesis was from the ARC and their
website is full of articles and numerous econometric studies on all different aspects of
poverty and possible solutions. I must admit that I tended towards the pessimistic side
when I began my thesis and did not expect the Distressed Counties Program to have
much of an effect, if any, on poverty rates, unemployment, and per capita income. I was
pleasantly surprised to find some evidence that the government is using their money
efficiently in this area to produce real results for these counties. While some wonder
about the culture of poverty, especially in the Appalachian region, my results certainly
suggest that something can be done to fight poverty and help those who have been
historically plagued by economic hardship.
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Table A.
Fixed Effects Regression, Poverty Rates as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.7505 F(8,592) = 222.57
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.1698 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.4053
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - -2.93662 -3.3 0.001 -4.6853 -1.18795
Manufacturing - -0.09024 -3.3 0.001 -0.14399 -0.0365
Government + 0.162149 3.5 0.001 0.071062 0.253236
Elderly + 0.342342 2.55 0.011 0.078594 0.60609
Minorities + 0.243517 2.03 0.043 0.007415 0.479619
High School - -0.09333 -2.23 0.026 -0.17547 -0.01118
College - 0.049581 0.49 0.622 -0.14795 0.24711
natlpovrates + 6.858649 12.99 0.000 5.821315 7.895983
_cons -65.4716 -7.42 0.000 -82.8084 -48.1348
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 592) = 5.43 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 7363.100871907654
Table B.
Fixed Effects Regression, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.3720 F(8,592) = 43.84
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.2707 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.3082
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 3.479503 10.49 0 2.827925 4.13108
Manufacturing - -0.08438 -5.75 0 -0.11321 -0.0555538
Government + 0.090666 3.69 0 0.042434 0.1388977
Elderly + -0.02394 -0.33 0.74 -0.16545 0.1175675
Minorities - -0.04433 -0.67 0.503 -0.17432 0.0856602
High School - -0.03108 -2.19 0.029 -0.05894 -0.0032126
College - -0.22631 -4.27 0 -0.33051 -0.1221153
NatlUnemp + 1.430875 12.84 0 1.211982 1.649768
_cons 2.344633 2.02 0.044 0.065792 4.623473
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 592) = 2.54 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 2067.204895418046
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Table C.
Fixed Effects Regression, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.8886 F(8,592) = 590.28
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.2712 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.6798
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum + 131.4791 2.57 0.01 31.0409 231.9172
Manufacturing + -5.89657 -2.47 0.014 -10.5869 -1.20623
Government - -16.9062 -4.23 0 -24.7516 -9.06081
Elderly - -8.68811 -0.74 0.459 -31.7299 14.35368
Minorities - 9.903746 0.94 0.349 -10.8551 30.66259
High School + 34.75888 12.99 0 29.50355 40.01421
College + 77.94694 9.02 0 60.98143 94.91244
GDPr + 36.71283 0.78 0.436 -55.8842 129.3099
_cons 1314.728 4.1 0 685.4136 1944.042
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Chow Test Regressions, Poverty Rate as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.8401 F(7,193) = 144.85
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0085 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1583
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - 0.008358 0.13 0.894 -0.11498 0.131699
Government + 0.209979 2.83 0.005 0.063892 0.356067
Elderly + 1.273236 3.95 0 0.637722 1.908751
Minorities + 0.533258 1.88 0.061 -0.02487 1.091389
High School - 0.062081 0.66 0.507 -0.12229 0.246453
College - 0.369053 1.39 0.167 -0.15558 0.893685
natlpovrates + 10.51642 9.92 0 8.425942 12.60689
_cons -136.747 -7.26 0 -173.898 -99.5955
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.6886 F(7,193) = 60.98
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0254 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.0695
Expected Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.08605 -2.78 0.006 -0.14706 -0.02504
Government + 0.073375 1.13 0.261 -0.05489 0.201637
Elderly + 0.346307 1.79 0.075 -0.03516 0.727771
Minorities + -0.22777 -1.28 0.204 -0.58 0.124453
High School - -0.1224 -2.66 0.008 -0.21299 -0.0318
College - 0.119967 1.01 0.313 -0.11408 0.354014
natlpovrates + 3.841059 4.82 0 2.270354 5.411765
_cons -24.4269 -1.75 0.081 -51.8819 3.028073
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 10.61 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 681.9449014128
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 4.53 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 2442.325724576856
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Table F.
Chow Test Regressions, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.3771 F(7,193) = 16.69
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0668 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1093
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.07409 -2.61 0.01 -0.13018 -0.018
Government + 0.075661 2.25 0.026 0.009224 0.142097
Elderly + 0.228985 1.56 0.12 -0.06003 0.518
Minorities + -0.14729 -1.14 0.254 -0.40112 0.10653
High School - 0.02849 0.67 0.504 -0.05536 0.112337
College - -0.10972 -0.91 0.366 -0.34831 0.128867
AvgNatlUnemp + 0.652208 1.73 0.086 -0.09278 1.397197
_cons 1.121853 0.57 0.569 -2.75755 5.001254
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.4638 F(7,193) = 23.85
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0897 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1423
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.21149 -7.14 0 -0.26991 -0.15307
Government + 0.083716 1.34 0.18 -0.0391 0.206536
Elderly + 0.110811 0.6 0.55 -0.25447 0.476089
Minorities + -0.00735 -0.04 0.966 -0.34463 0.329933
High School - -0.01257 -0.29 0.775 -0.09932 0.074184
College - 0.031845 0.28 0.78 -0.19227 0.255961
AvgNatlUnemp + 1.654711 4.49 0 0.927259 2.382163
_cons -0.91061 -0.14 0.887 -13.5172 11.69599
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 2.22 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 505.1200128175456
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 3.08 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 625.2995007601
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Table G.
Chow Test Regressions, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.8396 F(7,193) = 144.36
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0032 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1328
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing + -5.18998 -1.33 0.187 -12.9117 2.53175
Government - -9.42532 -2.03 0.043 -18.5711 -0.27954
Elderly - -54.1734 -2.69 0.008 -93.9596 -14.3871
Minorities - -35.9744 -2.03 0.044 -70.9161 -1.03264
High School + -2.11938 -0.36 0.718 -13.6619 9.423168
College + 13.91807 0.84 0.404 -18.9264 46.76256
natlpovrates - -543.232 -8.19 0 -674.106 -412.358
_cons 10960.48 9.29 0 8634.629 13286.34
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 3.71 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 9572365.799846392
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 400 R-sq: within = 0.8876 F(7,193) = 217.65
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.4197 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.5108
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing + -0.7868 -0.25 0.803 -7.00131 5.427709
Government - -16.4013 -2.48 0.014 -29.466 -3.33665
Elderly - 6.255553 0.32 0.751 -32.5999 45.11099
Minorities - -5.11403 -0.28 0.779 -40.9915 30.7634
High School + 6.303305 1.35 0.179 -2.92475 15.53136
College + 46.18352 3.82 0 22.34381 70.02323
natlpovrates - -780.26 -9.62 0 -940.25 -620.27
_cons 13327.38 9.4 0 10530.85 16123.91
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 193) = 9.95 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 7075313.5139198
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Table H.
Fixed Effects Regression, Poverty Rates as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Number of obs = 228 R-sq: within = 0.8000 F(8,163) = 81.51
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0193 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.3774
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - -4.38739 -1.98 0.05 -8.767384 -0.00739
Manufacturing - -0.0984 -1.65 0.101 -0.2163238 0.019521
Government + 0.323261 3.7 0 0.1508572 0.495664
Elderly + 0.571124 1.58 0.115 -0.1411095 1.283358
Minorities + 0.24996 1 0.319 -0.2439489 0.743869
High School - -0.03643 -0.37 0.711 -0.2304528 0.157602
College - -0.03916 -0.13 0.897 -0.6377641 0.559448
natlpovrates + 9.297451 7.16 0 6.732454 11.86245
_cons -96.6378 -4.54 0 -138.6874 -54.5881
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 163) = 4.16 Prob > F = 0.0000
Table I.
Fixed Effects Regression, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Number of obs = 228 R-sq: within = 0.4927 F(8,163) = 19.79
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.1182 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1988
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 5.172276 7.66 0 3.839705 6.504847
Manufacturing - -0.15505 -5.17 0 -0.214296 -0.09581
Government + 0.184062 4.16 0 0.0967431 0.271381
Elderly + 0.039476 0.22 0.825 -0.3130554 0.392008
Minorities - -0.0982 -0.76 0.45 -0.3543302 0.157937
High School - -0.10148 -3.46 0.001 -0.1593566 -0.04359
College - -0.12139 -0.84 0.404 -0.4080221 0.165246
NatlUnemp + 1.726036 7.87 0 1.292796 2.159276
_cons 1.969409 0.7 0.484 -3.572023 7.510841
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 163) = 2.72 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table J.
Fixed Effects Regression, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Number of obs = 228 R-sq: within = 0.8784 F(8,163) = 147.18
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.2730 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.5807
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum + 28.4022 0.31 0.755 -151.2417 208.0461
Manufacturing + -1.34467 -0.32 0.746 -9.525015 6.83567
Government - -19.469 -3.19 0.002 -31.52958 -7.40842
Elderly - -11.9259 -0.48 0.631 -60.87014 37.01841
Minorities - 23.7313 1.33 0.184 -11.42166 58.88425
High School + 40.51718 8.78 0 31.40244 49.63191
College + 31.60242 1.55 0.122 -8.583521 71.78837
GDPr + 32.62462 0.4 0.692 -129.7117 194.9609
_cons 1120.918 2.05 0.042 43.39959 2198.437
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 163) = 2.00 Prob > F = 0.0004
Table K.
Chow Test Results
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Chow Equation:
[RSSc - (RSSb + RSSa)] / k
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Chow Test Regressions, Poverty Rate as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.8699 F(7,50) = 47.77
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0077 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.1054
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - 0.202755 1.17 0.247 -0.14509 0.550603
Government + 0.587261 3.58 0.001 0.25744 0.917082
Elderly + -0.00766 -0.01 0.992 -1.5566 1.541285
Minorities + 1.00966 1.74 0.088 -0.15584 2.175162
High School - -0.06776 -0.25 0.801 -0.60614 0.470624
College - -0.67897 -0.9 0.374 -2.19978 0.841851
natlpovrates + 7.731676 2.68 0.01 1.944596 13.51876
_cons -80.078 -1.62 0.112 -179.479 19.32325
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 2.99 Prob > F = 0.0001 e(rss) = 900.9375026748784
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.8131 F(7,50) = 31.08
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0487 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.1159
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.10564 -1.8 0.078 -0.22376 0.012485
Government + 0.297988 2.49 0.016 0.057724 0.538252
Elderly + 1.281942 2.3 0.026 0.162409 2.401476
Minorities + -0.33167 -0.93 0.354 -1.04429 0.380953
High School - -0.22629 -2.32 0.025 -0.42259 -0.03
College - -0.48749 -1.47 0.147 -1.15239 0.177417
natlpovrates + 3.361387 1.91 0.062 -0.17646 6.899235
_cons -15.2776 -0.5 0.623 -77.2564 46.7012
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 4.62 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 228.4166126655165
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Table M.
Chow Test Regressions, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.4007 F(7,50) = 4.78
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0850 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.0863
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.1109 -1.57 0.122 -0.2525 0.03071
Government + 0.239819 3.59 0.001 0.10555 0.374087
Elderly + -0.10038 -0.32 0.75 -0.73095 0.530187
Minorities + -0.29303 -1.24 0.221 -0.76751 0.181438
High School - -0.02448 -0.22 0.823 -0.24365 0.194695
College - -0.16776 -0.54 0.589 -0.78688 0.45136
AvgNatlUnemp + 1.288684 1.4 0.167 -0.55746 3.134827
_cons 3.471941 0.82 0.413 -4.98318 11.92706
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 1.71 Prob > F = 0.0272 e(rss) = 149.3100145721238
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.6585 F(7,50) = 13.77
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0001 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.0621
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing - -0.17593 -3.72 0.001 -0.27091 -0.08095
Government + 0.098246 1.02 0.312 -0.09495 0.291438
Elderly + 0.514749 1.15 0.256 -0.38545 1.414947
Minorities + -0.03088 -0.11 0.914 -0.60388 0.542129
High School - 0.036117 0.46 0.648 -0.12172 0.193955
College - 0.468875 1.76 0.084 -0.06576 1.003513
AvgNatlUnemp + 2.746434 4.01 0 1.370554 4.122314
_cons -19.3337 -1.57 0.122 -44.0376 5.370159
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 3.26 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 147.6827658335847
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Table N.
Chow Test Regressions, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
57 county dataset (counties distressed in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000)
Before Regression (1970 and 1980)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.8807 F(7,50) = 52.71
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.0019 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.1908
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing + -12.8144 -1.72 0.092 -27.8049 2.176104
Government - -37.5372 -5.3 0 -51.7509 -23.3236
Elderly - -0.75262 -0.02 0.982 -67.5042 65.99895
Minorities - -19.1422 -0.77 0.448 -69.3695 31.08511
High School + -3.20672 -0.28 0.782 -26.4082 19.9948
College + 43.33183 1.33 0.19 -22.2078 108.8714
natlpovrates - -379.444 -3.06 0.004 -628.838 -130.05
_cons 8203.688 3.85 0 3919.99 12487.39
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 2.32 Prob > F = 0.0014 e(rss) = 1673202.168436158
After Regression (1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 114 R-sq: within = 0.9038 F(7,50) = 67.11
Number of groups = 57 between = 0.1352 Prob > F = 0.0004
overall = 0.5223
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Manufacturing + 3.03767 0.65 0.516 -6.29704 12.37238
Government - -20.0151 -2.12 0.039 -39.0019 -1.02834
Elderly - -55.9894 -1.27 0.21 -144.46 32.48115
Minorities - 4.130933 0.15 0.883 -52.1835 60.44534
High School + -2.90589 -0.38 0.708 -18.418 12.60619
College + -10.4558 -0.4 0.691 -62.9995 42.08785
natlpovrates - -993.739 -7.14 0 -1273.32 -714.162
_cons 17371.29 7.12 0 12473.45 22269.14
F test that all u_i=0: F(56, 50) = 4.59 Prob > F = 0.0000 e(rss) = 1426432.569743338
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Table O.
Fixed Effects Regression, Poverty Rates as Dependent Variable
91 county dataset (counties distressed in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 364 R-sq: within = 0.7553 F(8,265) = 102.27
Number of groups = 91 between = 0.0203 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.2847
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - -3.99352 -2.44 0.015 -7.211141 -0.7759
Manufacturing - -0.14737 -2.78 0.006 -0.2517591 -0.04297
Government + 0.19133 2.82 0.005 0.057913 0.324748
Elderly + 1.008229 3.99 0 0.5109839 1.505474
Minorities + 0.258644 1.25 0.214 -0.1501099 0.667398
High School - -0.02928 -0.39 0.695 -0.1763289 0.117773
College - 0.217328 0.93 0.351 -0.2409654 0.675622
Natlpovrates + 9.626804 10.12 0 7.754436 11.49917
_cons -109.032 -6.95 0 -139.9263 -78.1372
F test that all u_i=0: F(90, 265) = 4.89 Prob > F = 0.0000
Table P.
Fixed Effects Regression, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
91 county dataset (counties distressed in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 364 R-sq: within = 0.4943 F(8,265) = 32.38
Number of groups =
91 between = 0.1510 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.2744
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 4.958223 9.48 0 3.928475 5.987972
Manufacturing - -0.14237 -5.37 0 -0.1945938 -0.09015
Government + 0.112187 3.28 0.001 0.0449258 0.179448
Elderly + 0.306704 2.46 0.015 0.0607559 0.552653
Minorities - -0.03344 -0.3 0.761 -0.2498053 0.182921
High School - -0.09892 -4.24 0 -0.1448115 -0.05303
College - -0.16958 -1.49 0.138 -0.3937959 0.054632
NatlUnemp + 1.506345 8.76 0 1.167656 1.845034
_cons 0.742411 0.36 0.721 -3.345184 4.830007
F test that all u_i=0: F(90, 265) = 2.60 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table Q.
Fixed Effects Regression, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
91 county dataset (counties distressed in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 364 R-sq: within = 0.8417 F(8,265) = 176.17
Number of groups = 91 between = 0.1391 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.4287
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum + 24.53565 0.31 0.755 -130.1643 179.2356
Manufacturing + -0.96977 -0.24 0.813 -9.048624 7.109074
Government - -13.8681 -2.63 0.009 -24.26674 -3.46949
Elderly - -45.5782 -2.35 0.019 -83.70389 -7.45242
Minorities - 39.35974 2.35 0.02 6.354291 72.3652
High School + 37.31677 9.06 0 29.2057 45.42784
College + 21.6737 1.22 0.224 -13.3333 56.6807
GDPr + -166.4 -2.34 0.02 -306.5729 -26.2269
_cons 2309.014 5.14 0 1424.27 3193.758
F test that all u_i=0: F(90, 265) = 2.75 Prob > F = 0.0000
Table R.
Fixed Effects Regression, Poverty Rate as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Modified Distressed Counties Dummy (=1 only for distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.7507 F(8,592) = 222.81
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.6177 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.5968
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 1.665521 3.37 0.001 0.694759 2.636284
Manufacturing - -0.11936 -4.36 0 -0.17309 -0.06563
Government + 0.150529 3.23 0.001 0.059044 0.242014
Elderly + 0.218979 1.72 0.086 -0.03128 0.469236
Minorities + 0.149959 1.24 0.214 -0.08696 0.386876
High School - -0.25674 -9.92 0 -0.30758 -0.20591
College - 0.122424 1.19 0.235 -0.07961 0.324462
natlpovrates + 5.126858 15.73 0 4.486907 5.766809
_cons -34.6441 -6.9 0 -44.5032 -24.7851
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 592) = 5.91 Prob > F = 0.0000
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Table S.
Fixed Effects Regression, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Modified Distressed Counties Dummy (=1 only for distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.3405 F(8,592) = 38.21
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.1745 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.2013
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 2.285068 8.74 0 1.771845 2.79829
Manufacturing - -0.07938 -5.28 0 -0.10888 -0.04987
Government + 0.05319 2.11 0.035 0.003749 0.102632
Elderly + 0.258639 3.8 0 0.124963 0.392316
Minorities - -0.14532 -2.14 0.033 -0.2786 -0.01203
High School - 0.012646 1 0.317 -0.01216 0.037449
College - -0.16363 -2.94 0.003 -0.27304 -0.05421
NatlUnemp + 0.956969 9.81 0 0.765368 1.148569
_cons 0.854963 0.73 0.464 -1.43484 3.144771
F test that all u_i=0: F(199, 592) = 2.64 Prob > F = 0.0000
Table T.
Fixed Effects Regression, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Modified Distressed Counties Dummy (=1 only for distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.8949 F(8,592) = 630.29
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.3252 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.6781
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum + -260.279 -6.53 0 -338.54 -182.018
Manufacturing + -2.32273 -1 0.317 -6.87509 2.229625
Government - -15.7883 -4.07 0 -23.4064 -8.1702
Elderly - 4.533778 0.43 0.666 -16.1006 25.16813
Minorities - 16.8638 1.63 0.103 -3.41563 37.14324
High School + 46.06506 21.59 0 41.875 50.25513
College + 62.52007 7.27 0 45.6238 79.41633
GDPr + 126.8445 3.11 0.002 46.66406 207.0249
_cons 392.8398 1.54 0.123 -107.276 892.9553
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Table U.
Fixed Effects Regression, Poverty Rate as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Second Modified Dummy (=1 for non-distressed counties in 1970 and 1980 and =1 for
distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.7469 F(8,592) = 218.42
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.3891 Prob > F = 0.0000
between = 0.3891
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - -0.48641 -1.56 0.12 -1.09976 0.126948
Manufacturing - -0.09565 -3.44 0.001 -0.15027 -0.04103
Government + 0.174099 3.71 0 0.081889 0.266309
Elderly + 0.185119 1.44 0.151 -0.06771 0.437951
Minorities + 0.220566 1.82 0.069 -0.01695 0.458084
High School - -0.20385 -9.03 0 -0.24818 -0.15951
College - 0.010117 0.1 0.923 -0.19476 0.214989
natlpovrates + 5.317289 16.35 0 4.67854 5.956038
_cons -39.0468 -8.06 0 -48.5579 -29.5357
Table V.
Fixed Effects Regression, Unemployment as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Second Modified Dummy (=1 for non-distressed counties in 1970 and 1980 and =1 for
distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.2604 F(8,592) = 26.05
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.0968 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.1320
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum - 0.362461 2.01 0.045 0.008625 0.716297
Manufacturing - -0.0619 -3.89 0 -0.09314 -0.03067
Government + 0.064726 2.42 0.016 0.012188 0.117263
Elderly + 0.289612 3.98 0 0.146676 0.432549
Minorities - -0.11996 -1.65 0.099 -0.26249 0.022571
High School - 0.056355 4.53 0 0.031903 0.080806
College - -0.25191 -4.28 0 -0.36756 -0.13626
NatlUnemp + 0.729836 6.87 0 0.521157 0.938515
_cons -0.14554 -0.12 0.907 -2.5821 2.291032
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Table W.
Fixed Effects Regression, Per Capita Income as Dependent Variable
200 county dataset
Second Modified Dummy (=1 for non-distressed counties in 1970 and 1980 and =1 for
distressed counties in 1990 and 2000)
Number of obs = 800 R-sq: within = 0.8905 F(8,592) = 601.96
Number of groups = 200 between = 0.2720 Prob > F = 0.0000
overall = 0.6673
Expected
Sign Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
DCPdum + -111.655 -4.14 0 -164.641 -58.6697
Manufacturing + -3.23701 -1.37 0.172 -7.88211 1.408092
Government - -15.8336 -3.98 0 -23.6381 -8.0291
Elderly - -3.95391 -0.36 0.716 -25.2681 17.36031
Minorities - 16.14475 1.52 0.128 -4.67157 36.96108
High School + 40.74684 20.95 0 36.92787 44.56582
College + 67.29651 7.67 0 50.05429 84.53872
GDPr + 35.09445 0.8 0.422 -50.6619 120.8508
_cons 1057.64 4.09 0 550 1565.281
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